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THE CONSERVATORSHIP MODEL: A
MODIFICATION
Gregory S. Alexander*t

Reform-minded probate lawyers have discussed the idea of
ante-mortem probate for many years. 1 Yet, owing to several seemingly unavoidable defects, it has never attracted widespread support· and only recently has been implemented anywhere in the
United States. 2 In his article, Living Probate: The Conservatorship Model, 3 Professor John Langbein has eliminated many of
those defects and has made the idea much more feasible. In doing
so, he has contributed to the development of simple, convenient,
and efficient systems of probate. However, his proposal introduces new flaws that threaten the practical working of his procedural model.
Basically, Langbein proposes that living probate be a nonadversary proceeding rather than a lawsuit between the testator
and his heirs. Several problems that Langbein finds disturbing
attend the adversarial proceedings of earlier attempts at antemortem probate. 4 Among these are the potential disruption of
family harmony, various disadvantages to the heirs apparent,
and the absence of constraints against testators' overuse. To
avoid these problems, Langbein advocates a court-appointed
guardian ad litem who would represent all persons whose eventual property interests might be adversely affected5 by a determination that a testator had testamentary capacity to write his will
• Assistant Professor of Law, University of Georgia. B.A. 1970, University of Illinois;
J.D. 1973, Northwestern University.-Ed.
t I am indebted to my colleague, Richard V. Wellman, for his comments and sugges•
tions on an earlier draft of this Article.
1. The significant literature on ante-mortem probate extends from Cavers, Ante Mortem Probate: An Essay in Preventive Law, 1 U. Cm. L. R.Ev. 440 (1934), to Fink, AnteMortem Probate Revisited: Can an Idea Have Life After Death?, 37 Omo ST. L.J. 264
(1976). See also Kutscher, Living Probate, 21 A.B.A.J. 427 (1935); Redfearn, AnteMortem Probate, 38 CoM. L.J. 571 (1933).
2. Within the past year two states have added ante-mortem probate provisions to
their codes. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-08.1 (Supp. 1977); Amended Substitute House Bill
No. 505, 1978 Ohio Legis. Bull. 442 (to be codified as Omo REv. CODE ANN.§§ 2107.081.085 (Page)).
3. Langbein, Living Probate: The Conservatorship Model, 76 MICH. L. R.Ev. 63 (1978).
[Professor Langbein comments on a prepublication draft of Professor Alexander's Article
in id. at 74 n.50.-Ed.]
4. See Cavers, supra note 1; Fink, supra note 1.
5. This group would include those persons Langbein describes as "heirs apparent,"
Langbein, supra note 3, at 72, and any takers whose shares under previous wills ore
reduced or eliminated if the later will is probated. Id. at 78.
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and did so without undue influence. Specifically, Langbein seeks
to prevent open family strife in will contests through an imaginative use of the familiar device of the guardian ad litem. 6 Under
Langbein's proposal, although the real contestants have the right
to appear in the proceedings, they can also assert their interests
anonymously by revealing their objections to the guardian ad
litem. Anonymity reduces the disinclination many feel to offer
evidence of incapacity even when the will ought to be contested.
Moreover, the conservatorship model accommodates all the relevant interests, including those of potential heirs who are unborn
or otherwise unascertained at the time of the proceeding. Finally,
by requiring that counsel represent the testator and by shifting
.the costs of the guardian ad litem to the testator, the Langbein
proposal discourages excessive use of the ante-mortem procedure.
Only testators who genuinely need living probate-those whose
wills are likely to be extortionately challenged because of the
testator's advanced age or disabled condition7-would wish to
bear the predictably high costs of inhibiting post-mortem contests.
These advantages are undeniably real, but they are obtained
at a great price: under any evaluation of his proposal, features of
Langbein's procedure impose costs. Professor Langbein erroneously assumes that these costs are unavoidable under any system of living probate. I shall argue that these features are not
essential and that they may be eliminated without sacrificing the
advantages of his model. Providing testators alternative versions
of his procedure would achieve substantially the same benefits
while making living probate attractive to more testators than
Langbein's model is likely to. Specifically, allowing testators to
choose a nonbinding version of the conservatorship model would
more completely suit the differing needs of testators, thereby mitigating the costs of living probate while preserving its advantages.
I should emphasize that Langbein and I agree on the basic
proposition that some living-probate procedure is needed. Furthermore, his discussion convincingly establishes the case for a
non-adversary approach. While we disagree on some material
characteristics of such a procedure, it is worth reiterating that we
share the view that testators ought to be able to avoid postmortem litigation.
6. See generally UNIFORM PROBATE CODE art. V.
7. See Fink, supra note 1, at 289-90.
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I. THE CONSERVATORSHIP MODEL AND ITS COSTS
Underlying Langbein's article is his strong concern about the
threat of strike suits which contest valid wills in order to obtain
pretrial settlements that grant contestants part of what they
would receive if they defeated the will. 8 Langbein considers this
threat serious, given some of the peculiarities of American procedure. In particular, he disfavors the use of jury trials in will contests and the rule that defendants bear their own litigation costs
even where the plaintiffs claim is unjustified. In Langbein's view,
these procedural rules make illegitimate will contests easier, since
jurors generally sympathize with disappointed family members
more than judges do and since the cost of a contest is minimized. 9
To discourage the strike suit, Langbein concludes, antemortem probate proceedings must be binding. Unless the procee_ding's declaratory judgment estops disappointed heirs from
bringing any post-mortem contests, the danger that the will
might be upset or that the estate might be subjected to further
litigation makes the ante-mortem proceeding worthless to the
testator. A binding procedure, however, unmistakably benefits
testators by impeding strike suits.
But a testator necessarily incurs costs under a binding procedure-with its collateral estoppel-which he would not incur
under a nonbinding procedure. Specifically, Langbein insists that
if the judgment is to be binding, notice and a right to appear must
be given to heirs apparent and beneficiaries of the will in issue or
of a former will that is amended or revoked; he also expects the
petitioning testator to attach his will to the petition, thereby
disclosing its contents to the court and all parties. As Langbein
8. Other proponents of living probate share Langbein's concern and have pointed to
examples of contests brought by disgruntled survivors. See Cavers, supra note 1, at 443 &
n.10; Fink, supra note 1, at 265-66 & 265 n.1.
A major empirical study of testamentary behavior in Cuyahoga County, Ohio (Cleveland), corroborates this concern. The study concluded that settlements ended most will
contests and that "[p]eople who institute[d] claims or contests had a very good chance
of getting something . . . ." M. SussMAN, J. CATES, & D. SMITH, THE FAMILY AND
INHERITANCE 188 (1970).
9. Substantial sentiment disfavors the use of juries in probate matters. One source
of this sentiment is the belief that lay persons lack the perspective and legal training to
deal knowledgeably and rationally with problems of testamentary capacity and undue
influence. See generally Simes, The Function of Will Contests, 44 MICH. L. lli:v. 503, 55557 (1946). Empirical data support many observers' intuition that juries routinely overturn
wills that disadvantage those persons closest to the testator, even when the substantive
standards for capacity and undue influence are satisfied. See Note, Will Contests on Trial,
6 STAN. L. lli:v. 91, 92 & nn.4-5 (1953). The Stanford study further indicates that trial
judges provide little protection against mistaken jury verdicts. Id. at 92.
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notes, 10 capacity to make a specific disposition, not capacity in
general, is at issue in testamentary litigation. The standard for
capacity is usually thought to require that the trier consider the
specifically contested disposition. 11 Shifting the contest from
post- to ante-mortem noes not alter that requirement, nor does
changi.ng the proceeding from adversarial to non-adversarial. 12
Ante-mortem disclosure itself, however, may have significant
consequences. Family members normally discover the contents
of a will only after the testator's death, by which time, of course,
the will's confidentiality need not be preserved, since the testator's relationship with his heirs, some of whom the will may have
disappointed, is ended. In the ante-mortem format, however,
personal relationships continue after the probate proceeding and
may suffer seriously from the disclosure of the will's contents.
That is one reason testators usually wish to keep their dispositions secret. Langbein's binding-decree version of living probate,
by making the will a public record of the court, strips testamentary acts of this attractive confidentiality.
Sacrificing the confidentiality of the conventional testamentary process may deter some testators who need ante-mortem
probate from using it. 13 Granted, it cannot be said confidently
10. Langbein, supra note 3, at 82.
11. The same requirement holds true for undue-influence cases. Proof of both incapacity and undue influence is heavily circumstantial. Incapacity and undue influence are
frequently found, particularly by juries, when the will contains "unnatural provisions,"
that is, bequests to strangers at the expense of the natural objects of the testator's bounty,
particularly family members. Comment, A Case Against Admitting into Evidence the
Dispositive Elements of a Will in a Contest Based on Testamentary Incapacity, 2 CoNN.
L. REv. 616, 619-21 (1970); Note, supra note 9, at 92. The mere presence of unnatural
provisions, of course, establishes neither incapacity nor undue influence. T. ATKINSON,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF WILLS 255-56 (2d ed. 1953).
12. The terms "adversarial" and "non-adversarial" call for a word of clarification.
Professor Langbein's model would lead to adversary litigation if an heir apparent contested the inter vivos proceeding, but his procedure would not otherwise follow the conventional adversarial format of will contests. Moreover, it is arguable that Langbein's model
invariably leads to adversarial action by the guardian ad litem. Suppose, for example, that
family members disclose evidence of incapacity to the guardian. His fiduciary duty would
require him to contest the will vigorously. Langbein suggests that the guardian "would
not necessarily have to wage bitter contest . • . no matter how sane the testator appeared,
but he would be obliged to put the testator to fair proof." Langbein, supra note 3, at 79.
But given the guardian'!! fiduciary duty, and his liability in the event that a failure to
litigate vigorously is viewed as a breach of that duty, he will feel a strong incentive to
challenge the will on every possible ground of invalidity.
13. In fact, the Model Probate Code excluded any provision for ante-mortem probate
partially because publicity was thought to be unavoidable in an inter viv'Js procedure:
"The practical advantages of such a device are not great in view of the fact that few
testators would wish to encounter the publicity involved in such a proceeding." MODEL
PROBATE CODE, Introduction at 20 (1946).
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that testators prefer secrecy of contents to security against postmortem challenges, for no occasion to make this choice has yet
arisen. But if an ante-mortem ·probate procedure without this
potential disincentive to its own use can be devised, testators
have a "moral claim" 14 to such a procedure. Langbein's model
assumes that the choice between confidentiality and security is
unavoidable and opts for security. In the next Part, I suggest that
if that choice must be made, individual testators should make it.
II.

MODIFYING THE CoNSERVATORSHIP MODEL:

A NONBINDING

OPI'ION

Even if notice and disclosure are indispensable to a binding
ante-mortem procedure, 15 testators need not be put to the choice
between disclosure or probate only after death. Ante-mortem probate would serve more testators if they could chose between a
binding procedure that requires disclosure to all the parties and
a nonbinding procedure that requires disclosure only to the trier.
A system with that option would benefit testators by permitting
them, if they wished to keep their wills secret, to forego some, but
not all, protection against post-mortem contests rather than to
forego inter vivos security altogether.
The option of nonbinding ante-mortem probate would be
worthless, however, unless it actually protected testators to at
least some extent against post-mortem contests. The civil law,
notarial-will model used in European legal systems largely because of the notary's influence, substantially protects wills
against post-mortem testamentary litigation and yet preserves
the secrecy of the contents. 16 Since American procedure has no
counterpart to the notary, one might suppose that testators in
this country can protect themselves against will contests only
through a binding judgment, with all its costs. Langbein, for one,
disfavors the notarial model because of differences between civil
law and American procedures. 17 But a nonbinding version of antemortem probate that adopts the features of Langbein's proposal
other than its binding effect would, for reasons that contribute to
the success of the notarial will, discourage, though admittedly not
preclude, post-mortem litigation.
14. Langbein, supra note 3, at 85.
15. See text at note 26 infra.
16. M. RHEINSTEIN & M. GLENDON, Tm: LAw OF DECEDENTS' ESTATES 198 (1971).
17. For general discussions of the notarial will and its forms, see C. AUBRY & C. RAu,
DaoIT CML FRANC,AIS §§ 670-71 (6th ed. 1954) (3 CIVIL LAw TRANSLATIONS 149-73 (1969));
M. RHEINSTEIN & M. GLENDON, supra note 16, at 198-99.
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A nonbinding, ex parte proceeding would produce a record of
considerable weight, and, like the notarial will, would preserve
strong evidence on the iss~es of incapacity and undue influence.
Existing probate procedures do not preserve such evidence as
effectively. The availability of well-preserved evidence on these
questions would, of course, make it more difficult to successfully
c;:ontest the will post mortem.
Judgments rendered in these proceedings would compare
somewhat to those in the Uniform Probate Code1 s (UPC's) informal probate proceedings,18 but would also differ notably. Like
informal probate, the ante-mortem proceedings would be nonconclusive, 19 but they would command more respect and deserve
more weight than informal probate because they would issue from
a judge, rather than a nonjudicial registrar, and would not be
used routinely. Moreover, unlike informal probate, the antemortem procedure would require that the guardian ad litem independently provide information about the testator's capacity to
the court. The conservatorship model's safeguards would still
·apply, as would its procedure for establishing testamentary capacity and freedom from undue influence, except that only the
testator and the guardian ad litem could appear and be heard. If
the testator met t~e capacity requirements, the court would issue
a declaratory judgment establishing a presumption of validity in
any post-mortem contests. Unlike the presumption that arises
under the UPC from the execution of a will with a self-proving
clause, 20 this presumption would apply to the substantive determination of capacity and undue influence, not merely to compliance with formalities of execution.
Most important, that presumption should help proponents of
the will obtain summary judgment in post-mortem contests. The
heirs apparent and disfavored devisees under previous wills could
contest the will post mortem, but to overcome the presumption
of validity they would need evidence that the court had not considered in the ante-mortem proceeding. They would retain the
right to prove fraud in the ante-mortem proceeding, but absent
such proof, the proponents would be entitled to summary judgment. This restriction should help deter "depredatious" strike
suits, since contestants would have to offer new evidence of incapacity or undue influence.
It might be argued that the requirement of new evidence
18. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE art. ill, pt. 3.
19. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 3-302.
20. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-504.
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would not deter such suits, for contestants could easily find some
scraps of evidence that were not presented to the court in the
original proceeding. Surely not every possible indicium of incapacity or undue influence would be exhaustively considered at
the ante-mortem hearing, especially since unattending family
members would have ready access to evidence of the testator's
behavior that would be probative of his testamentary capacity.
Additional evidence having been found, contestants could escape
summary judgment and display the evidence to a sympathetic
jury.
To forestall such use of new but weak or even fraudulent
evidence to get the question of capacity before a jury, the court
should preliminarily evaluate new evidence to determine whether
it establishes probable cause for invalidation. 21 This simple
screening process, which would sift new evidence for credibility
and probative value beyond that of evidence already considered
ante mortem, should effectively eliminate post-mortem challenges based on trivial, patently incredible, or essentially repetitive evidence. Evidence which does not establish probable cause
for invalidation should not reach the jury, and the court, upon a
preliminary finding that there is not such probable cause, should
issue a summary judgment.
The threat of post-mortem strike suits looms so large in a
nonbinding version of ante-mortem probate principally because
juries tend to decide against wills, especially those which disfavor
members of the testator's family. 22 This tendency, by increasing
the probability of a successful suit, encourages disappointed heirs
to initiate a contest. The proponents' disadvantage in this situation is remedied, however, or at least considerably reduced, if the
issues are tried before judges, who are better suited than jurors
to grapple with technical questions of capacity and undue influence. 23 As the Model Probate Code recognized, "Most of the questions of fact likely to arise in connection with probate matters can
be decided more satisfactorily by the judge than by the jury and
at less expense. " 24 Thus, the conservatorship model's reformeliminating the jury trial from ante-mortem proceedings-could
advantageously be completed by removing the jury from proceedings after the inter vivos hearing as well. The procedure for
21. For two uses of probable cause in will contests, see REsTATEMENT OF PROPERTY
§ 428, Comment k; UNIFORM PROBATE CooE § 3-905.
22. See Note, supra note 9, at 92, 95-96.
23. See Simes, supra note 9, at 555-57.

24. MODEL PROBATE CODE § 18(a), comment (1946).
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post-mortem contests after inter vivas probate would be unique
in several respects, so there would be no need to adhere to the
procedural conventions of testamentary litigation in this context.
States recognizing the right to jury trial could reserve the right
for contests not preceded by an ante-mortem proceeding. Of
course, spurious contests ar.e brought less to overturn the will
than to exact a settlement, but fewer contestants would be willing
to bear the costs of initiating testamentary litigation without the
advantage of jury trial.
Following its policy of flexibility, the UPC allows interested
persons to choose between alternative procedures for settling an
estate. 25 Such flexibility should characterize ante-mortem probate as well. Those testators who would benefit from antemortem probate have different needs and preferences, a wider
variety of which could be accommodated by making available
more than one kind of ante-mortem probate. Testators whose
circumstances portend contests by disappointed heirs apparent
or devisees may consider a binding ante-mortem probate essential. Testators who anticipate no strike suits may prefer the less
drastic alternative, since it offers-them both some protection
against extortion and privacy for their testamentary acts. This
flexible approach may relieve the problem of under-utilization of
ante-mortem probate and may consequently make more worthwhile the effort to implement living probate.
III.

CONCLUSION

My proposal of an alternative to Langbein's model assumes,
as does Langbein, 26 that an ante-mortem determination will
wholly estop subsequent challenges to testamentary capacity
only if all those whose interests are affected receive notice of the
proceeding and an opportunity to be heard. That due process
requires notice of probate proceedings is not, however, as clear as
that assumption may seem to suggest. Courts have traditionally
accorded wide discretion to states in probate matters in deference
to states' interests in facilitating simple and efficient systems. of
wealth succession and in securing the title of property transferred. The Supreme Court has never tested the weight of that
deference in a due pro_cess case. 27 Furthermore, heirs apparent,
25. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE§§ 3-102, 3-105.
26. See Langbein, supra note 3, at 78-79.
27. It is worth noting that the Supreme Court has recognized this state interest in
recent decisions involving the constitutional validity of state statutes limiting the rights
of illegitimate children to inherit. E.g., Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 770 (1977);
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and even devisees under former wills, arguably do not possess the
kind of interest that due process protects; that question, too, is
less clear than Langbein suggests. Thus, a binding ante-mortem
determination of testamentary capacity might not require notice
and the attending loss of confidentiality after all. I will pursue
these issues and their significance for the Langbein model in a
subsequent article.
Whatever the resolution of those questions, Langbein, in attempting to make ante-mortem probate more feasible, has attended to one objective-protecting testators from illegitimate
post-mortem contests-at the sacrifice of another-the confidentiality of the will. As a result, his otherwise valuable proposal
loses much of its practical appeal; few testators are likely to risk
the social repercussions of disclosing the contents of their wills.
Testators need not be put to this choice, however. Allowing testators to choose between alternative procedures that emphasize different benefits and exact different costs would fully comport with
the UPC's dedication to flexibility in probate process. Absent
data indicating that most of those who would use ante-mortem
probate would prefer absolute protection against post-mortem
litigation rather than confidentiality, it would be counterproductive to condition ante-mortem probate on the costly terms of
Professor Langbein's model.
Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 170 (1972); Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S.
532, 537-39 (1971). The Court recently reaffirmed the strength of this interest in Lalli v.
Lalli, 99 S. Ct. 518, 525 (1978). Although these cases deal with equal protection requirements of state succession statutes and consequently are only tangentially related to the
issue posed here, they are nevertheless indicative of the Court's basic attitude on the
degree of deference owed to states in succession matters.

...

